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The Effects of Competition on Banks’ Risk Taking
with and without Deposit Insurance




We consider the joint effect of competition and deposit insurance on risk taking
by banks when the riskiness of banks is unobservable to depositors. It turns out
that the magnitude of risk taking depends on the type of bank competition. If the
bank is a monopoly or banks compete only in the loan market, deposit insurance
has no effect on risk taking. In that case the banks are too risky but extreme risk
taking is avoided. In contrast, introducing deposit insurance increases risk taking
if banks compete for deposits. Then, deposit rates become excessively high and
force the banks to take extreme risks. Regarding the effects of increasing
competition when there is deposit insurance, the results imply that deposit
competition encourages risk taking but loan market competition does not. Our
results can be extended more generally to insurance guaranty funds
Key words: Deposit insurance, Insurance guaranty funds, Bank and insurance
regulation, Moral hazard, Credit rationing, Financial Fragility
JEL classification: G21, G22, G284
Pankkikilpailun ja talletusvakuutuksen yhteisvaikutus
pankkien riskinottoon




Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan kilpailun ja talletusvakuutuksen vaikutuksia pankkien
riskinottoon, kun tallettajat eivät kykene havaitsemaan pankkien riskejä. Osoit-
tautuu, että riskinoton laajuus riippuu kilpailutilanteesta. Jos pankilla on monopo-
liasema tai pankit kilpailevat luottoasiakkaista, talletusvakuutus ei vaikuta riskin-
ottoon – pankit ottavat liikaa riskejä, mutta välttävät äärimmäistä riskinottoa. Jos
pankit kilpailevat talletuksista, talletusvakuutusjärjestelmä lisää riskinottoa, koska
korkeat talletuskorot pakottavat pankit sjoittamaan äärimmäisen suurituottoisiin –
ja riskialttiisiin – kohteisiin. Jos talletukset ovat vakuutettuja, kilpailuasetelman
muutokset vaikuttavat riskinoton laajuuteen: talletuskilpailun kiristyminen lisää
riskinottoa, mutta luottomarkkinakilpailun lisääntymisellä ei ole vaikutusta. Tu-
lokset ovat yleistettävissä vakuutuslaitosten takuurahastoihin.
Asiasanat: talletusvakuutus, vakuutuslaitosten takuurahastot, pankki- ja vakuutus-
toiminnan sääntely, luotonsäännöstely
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Deposit insurance usefully prevents bank runs (e.g. Diamond & Dybvig 1983) and
improves risk sharing (e.g. Park 1996). Unfortunately, it may also generate an
asset substitution moral hazard problem. Viewing deposit insurance as a put
option, Merton (1977) shows that deposit insurance encourages a bank to take
excessive risks: if risky loans succeed a bank earns high profits whereas as in the
reserve case the insurer bears the costs of risk taking.
1 John et al. (1991), however,
show that the same risk taking incentives exist even without deposit insurance
when bank risk is unobservable to depositors. The risk-taking problem is
fundamentally attributable to the convexity of the levered equity payoff from the
limited liability option that exists in full force in a deposit market even without
deposit insurance.
2 In our paper, we extend their analysis by showing that deposit
insurance may increase risk taking even when bank risk is unobservable if the
banks compete for deposits. In the absence of deposit insurance, a credit rationing
equilibrium occurs (see Stiglitz & Weiss 1981).
3 Uninformed depositors rationally
anticipate that bank’s risk taking is increasing in deposit interest rate. This
increase of risk may be so extensive that depositors’ expected return drop by the
rise in the deposit rate. Hence, depositors optimally avoid banks that offer
suspiciously high interest on deposits. In contrast, with deposit insurance
depositors optimally accept only the highest interest offers. Consequently, deposit
insurance may drive up deposit rates increasing risk taking even when bank risk is
unobservable.
The magnitude of the moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance
crucially depends on the type of bank competition. When a bank is a monopoly
(or bank competition takes place in loan markets), risk taking is socially excessive
but the most risky assets are avoided. Even if the extreme assets yield a very high
success output, their success probability is so small that the bank (the
entrepreneur) earns a higher expected profit by choosing safer assets. When the
banks compete for deposits, the funds are invested in the most risky assets
available. Depositors optimally favour extreme risk taking since they receive the
                                                
1 Empirical evidence mostly supports the moral hazard hypothesis. Evidence on both moral hazard
and adverse selection is found by Calomiris (1989) on voluntary deposit insurance schemes in
1800s and by Wheelock & Kumbhakar (1995) on such systems in Kansas during 1909–1929.
Grossman (1992) finds that the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance System in 1934
increased risk taking. Hovakmian & Kane (2000) present evidence on excessive risk taking by
U.S. commercial banks during 1985 to 1994. Keeley (1990) and Brewer (1995) also present
evidence on moral hazard, but Karels & McClatchey (1999) find no such evidence within the
credit union industry.
2 John et al. (1991) suggest that risk taking could be prevented by adopting a tax system in which a
higher tax rate is imposed on high levels of profits compared to the tax rate on low level of profits.
Alternatively, risk taking could be prevented by collecting the insurance premium in the form of
upfront fee plus a specified number of warrants. In their another paper, John et al. (1994), they
examine how bank risk is effected by bank’s equity ownership. Interestingly, the efficiency of
borrowers’ investments may increase and the bank risk decrease with increased equity ownership.
3 In the Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), a credit rationing equilibrium occurs in a loan market. Banks
understand that the interest rate a bank charges may itself affect the riskness of the pool of loans
by either sorting potential borrowers (the adverse selection effect) or by affecting the actions of
borrowers (the incentive effect). As the loan interest rate rises, the riskness of those who borrow
increases, possibly lowering the bank’s profits. Hence, there exist an interest rate which maximizes
the expected returns to a bank. Clementz (1986), Clementz & Ritthaler (1992) and Jaffee &
Stiglitz (1990) survey the literature of credit rationing.8
same payment whether the assets succeed or not. If assets succeed, the bank can
pay very high interest on deposits, whereas in the reserve case the bank fails and
the insurer pays an equal indemnity to fully insured depositors. Competition for
deposits may thus drive the bank sector into instability.
4
Variety of theoretical models have been put forth to examine deposit
insurance, bank competition and financial fragility. In Chan et al. (1992), Keeley
(1991) and Hyytinen & Takalo (2000), bank’s market power generates high future
profits that may restrict risk taking today. Matutes & Vives (1996) focus on the
economics of scale: a bank perceived to be safer obtains a higher margin and a
larger market share, which tends to make the bank yet safer. Deposit insurance
improves welfare by preventing systematic confidence crises and extending the
deposit market, but it may also increase competition for deposits and bank
failures. In contrast to our setting their bank cannot influence on the risk of its
assets and bank risk is assumed to be observable to depositors. Matutes & Vives
(2000) present a comprehensive model of imperfect bank competition with social
bank failure costs. They find that in all market configurations (insured and
uninsured) may yield too high deposit rates when social failure costs are high.
Maximal risk-taking incentives occur with flat premium deposit insurance, and
minimal incentives occur with risk-based insurance. Gorton & Rosen (1995)
present a possibility that moral hazard associated with deposit insurance is not the
most important reason for multiplied bank failures. They argue that a bank
manager may keep their jobs only if a bank is profitable. In an ‘unhealthy’
banking industry the managers may obtain profits only by taking excessive risks.
5
In the insurance theory, e.g. Holmström (1979), Shavell (1979), moral hazard
problem is traditionally reduced by limiting insurance coverage. We show that
partial coverage may be useful also in the context of deposit insurance, if bank
competition takes place in deposit market. In contrast, it is useless if banks
compete for borrowers or the bank is a monopoly.
Section 2 characterizes an economic environment. In the next sections, risk
taking problem is analyzed in three extreme competition alternatives: first, a bank
is a monopoly (section 3), then several banks compete for borrowers (section 4),
and finally the banks compete for deposits (section 5). Regulatory implications for
both bank sector and insurance industry are discussed in section 6.
                                                
4 Insurance guaranty funds – which ex post pool the resources of solvent insurers to pay covered
claims against an insolvent insurer – create the very same moral hazard problem as deposit
insurance. For example, Bohn & Hall (1997) and Lee et al. (1997) find evidence of moral hazard
in insurance guaranty funds. Our results can be generalized to these funds.
5 In the banking literature, several methods to restrict the moral hazard problem has been
suggested: for example, capital requirements (e.g. Rochet 1992), risk-based deposit insurance
premiums (Pennacchi 1987, Chan et al. 1992, Nagarajan & Sealey 1998, Matutes & Vives 2000),
deposit rate regulation (Chan & Mak 1985, Matutes & Vives 2000), direct lending restrictions
(Chan & Mak 1985, Matutes & Vives 2000), warrants and taxes (John et al. 1991), optimal bank
closure policy (Mailath & Mester 1994) and bank transparency/market discipline (e.g. Berlin et al.
1991, Hyytinen & Takalo 2000). Berlin et al. (1991) and Bhattacharya et al. (1998) survey this
literature. Garcia (1999) reviews the characteristics of explicit systems of deposit insurance in 68
countries.9
2 The economic environment
The economy consists of four groups of agents, namely depositors, banks,
entrepreneurs and a deposit insurer.
6  (QWUHSUHQHXUV are risk-neutral and have
alternative investment projects. Each project lasts for a period, requires one unit of
investment and yields output Y(p) with probability p,  [ ] p , p pÎ , and no output
otherwise. It is assumed that Y’(p) < 0 and that pY(p) is concave in p with a

























Point A: The optimal risk of the society
Point B: The chosen risk level when a bank is a monopoly or
banks compete for borrowers with or without deposit
insurance.
Point  C: The chosen risk level in the absence of deposit
insurance when the banks compete for deposits.
Point D: The chosen risk level when deposits are insured and
banks compete for deposits.
The risk-return function.
1) Deposit insurance does not effect on risk taking when a bank
is a monopoly or banks compete for borrowers (point B).
2) Deposit insurance increases risk taking when banks compete
for deposits (a move from Point C to Point D).
                                                
6 Even if we have attempted to follow the assumptions of John et al. (1991), some changes have
been made to simplify the analysis. For example, we utilize a different risk-return function, which
is rather similar than in Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) and Chan et al. (1992).10
An entrepreneur has no wealth of his own and he must search credit for his
project. Banks are willing to finance the project at a loan interest R. Thus, an
entrepreneur earns expected return
[]. 0 , R ) p ( Y p E E ³ p - = p (2.2)
$EDQN is risk neutral and it has no equity. It grants loans at an interest rate R and
pays interest r on deposits. A bank raises enough deposits to cover both the
insurance premium af and the needs of the project 1, 1+af in total.
7 The bank’s
expected profit is
[] . 0 , ) 1 ( r R p B B ³ p af + - = p (2.3)
Notice that the bank’s loan returns are perfectly correlated.
8 The bank is assumed
to be able to monitor entrepreneurs’ project choices.
$ GHSRVLW LQVXUHU, a risk neutral agent of the government, collects an
insurance premium af at the beginning of the period (The full insurance premium
is denoted by f. The insurer selects coverage a, 0 £ a £ 1. When a = 1 deposits
are fully insured and when a = 0 there is no insurance). At the end of the period
he indemnifies a fraction a of deposits if the bank fails. The chosen project risk
and the project outputs are unobservable to the insurer, who can only observe
whether the projects succeed or not. The insurer, however, anticipates risk taking
correctly and charges such a premium that expected indemnities to depositors can
be covered, af = a(1–p)(1+af)r, from which a zero profit insurance premium can
be solved
.
r *) p 1 ( 1




Here the anticipated success probability is denoted by p*. Given (2.4), we can
rewrite r(1+af) in the more useful form as
.




As in John et al. (1991), GHSRVLWRUV are assumed to be risk neutral. They save in a
bank, which pays interest r on deposit with probability p and fails with probability
1 – p. In the latter case the insurer pays an indemnity ar to depositors. Depositors
are unable to observe the bank risk but they anticipate the future risk correctly, p*.
Hence, depositors’ expected utility is
                                                
7 This assumption is similar to John et al. (1991), when their bank has no equity. The formulation
is almost identical, if the banks form a mutual deposit insurance system, in which solvent banks ex
post cover the deposit claims against insolvent members.
8 Perfect correlation is bank’s optimal choice. Besides, sectorally and geographically specialized
loan portfolios or macroeconomic shocks may make the project returns correlated. The assumption
of perfect correlation is rather standard in bank regulation models, e.g. John et al. (1991), Chan et
al. (1992) and Mailath & Mester (1994).11
. r *) p 1 ( r * p *) p , r ( U - a + = (2.6)
The risk-free interest of the economy, 1, determines depositors’ reservation utility.
The following assumption ensures a bank formation in our setting.
$VVXPSWLRQ 7KHEDQNFDQSD\VXFKLQWHUHVWRQGHSRVLWVWKDWGHSRVLWRUVREWDLQ
WKHLU UHVHUYDWLRQ XWLOLW\ 7KH ORZHVW VXIILFLHQW GHSRVLW UDWH LV GHQRWHG E\ U
8US 
In summary, the time line is the following.
1. The deposit insurer announces a deposit insurance policy (premium,
coverage).
2. Banks set deposit rates and raise deposits.
3. Banks pay insurance premiums.
4. Banks grant loans to borrowers.
5. At the end of the period project returns come true. If a bank succeeds, it can
pay interest on deposits and the rest of the returns are devided by bank’s
shareholders. If the bank fails, its shareholders do not get anything. The
insurer indemnifies a respecified fraction of deposits.
3 A monopoly bank
In this section we present the results of John et al. (1991) in our framework:
deposit insurance has no effect on risk taking.
A bank has market power both in deposit and loan markets. In the deposit
markets, it pushes deposit interest rate down to the minimum level r* such that
depositors obtain their reservation utility, U(r*, p*) = 1. In the loan markets, it
raises loan interest to the upper limit, R = Y(p). Hence, the bank maximizes its
expected profits subject to the depositors’ and entrepreneurs’ participation
constraints. Given R  =  Y(p) and r  =  r*, bank’s expected profit (2.3) can be
rewritten as
[] . ) 1 ( * r ) p ( Y p B af + - = p (3.1)
Notice that since the insurer and depositors are unable to observe bank risk, both
the deposit rate and the insurance premium are independent of the risk. Because
the bank can completely control entrepreneurs, it will choose the risk that
maximizes its expected profits. The bank chooses the probability of success so
that
[] ), 1 ( * r ) p ( pY
dp
d
af + = (3.2)
which is satisfied when p = p*: the choice corresponds with anticipations. Since
the right hand-side of (3.2) exceeds zero, the choice is socially too risky, p* < p°.
Given U(r*, p*) = 1, deposit rate can solved from (2.6) as12
.





By inserting this deposit rate into (2.5) we obtain r*(1+af) = 1/p*. Now bank’s








Thus, the chosen project risk is independent of deposit insurance coverage, a, as
in John et al. (1991). Let us examine two extreme cases in more detail.
– When deposits are fully insured: a = 1, r* = 1 and f = (1–p*)/p*. We see that
r*(1+af) = (1 + (1–p*)/p*) = 1/p*. Since deposits are insured, deposit interest
rate is independent of the bank risk. Hence, the bank can increase project risk
– and the success output of the project – without a rise in the deposit rate. This
makes risk taking profitable: if risky projects succeed, the bank earns high
lending returns, while in the reserve case the bank fails and the insurer bears
the costs of risk taking. Risk taking could be avoided by adopting risk based
insurance premiums if the insurer observed bank risk.
– When no deposit insurance exist: a = 0, r* = 1/p* and r*(1+af) = 1/p*. Since
bank risk is unobservable to depositors, deposit rate is independent of the
bank risk even in the absence of deposit insurance. Hence, the bank can again
increase project risk without a rise in the deposit rate. If risky projects
succeed, the bank earns high returns, whereas in the reserve case the bank
fails and depositors bear the costs of risk taking. Market discipline would
prevent risk taking if depositors observed bank risk.
This section can be summarized as follows.
3URSRVLWLRQ $PRQRSRO\EDQNWDNHVWRRPXFKULVNEXWDYRLGVH[WUHPHULVN
WDNLQJ8QGHUPRQRSRO\GHSRVLWLQVXUDQFHKDVQRHIIHFWRQULVNWDNLQJ
4 Competition for borrowers
In this section we show that when bank competition takes place in loan markets
deposit insurance has no effect on risk taking.
There exist several banks having market power in deposit markets but not in
loan markets. The banks pay the minimum interest r* on deposits such that
depositors are pushed down to their reservation utility level, U(r*,  p*)  =  1.
Competition in a loan market decreases loan interest to R  =  r*(1+af) so that
banks earn zero profits. Hence, entrepreneurs’ expected earnings (2.2) are now
maximized subject to the depositors’ and banks’ participation constraints. Given
the loan interest R = r*(1+af), the entrepreneur’s expected earnings (2.2) can be
rewritten as
[] , ) 1 ( * r ) p ( Y p E af + - = p13
which is exactly the same as the monopoly bank’s expected profit (3.1), and thus
(3.3) shows the entrepreneurs’ optimal project choice. The chosen projects are
again socially too risky and the magnitude of excessive risk taking is the same as
when the bank is a monopoly. The project choices are not effected by deposit
insurance. Let us again examine both extreme cases in more detail.
– When deposits are insured, deposit rate is independent of the bank risk. Since
banks compete for borrowers, this benefit transfers through the bank system
to borrowers: loan interest rate is independent of the project risk. The fixed
loan interest encourages entrepreneurs to take risks. If risky projects succeed,
entrepreneurs earn high returns. If projects are unsuccessful, entrepreneurs
cannot repay their loans, the banks suffer from credit losses and fail. The
deposit insurer then bears the costs of risk taking.
– The case is very similar when deposit are uninsured. Now deposit rate is
independent of the bank risk, since the risk is unobservable to depositors.
Moreover, when the bank fails the cost of risk taking are bore by depositors.




5 Competition for deposits
In this section we show that deposit insurance increases risk taking when banks
compete for deposits.
There exist several banks having market power in loan markets but not in
deposit markets. The banks can raise the loan interest to the borrowers’ zero profit
level, R = Y(p). Since the banks compete for deposits, depositors’ expected utility
is maximized subject to the EDQN¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ FRQVWUDLQ (2.3),
p[Y(p) – r(1+af)] ³ 0, and EDQN¶VLQFHQWLYHFRQVWUDLQW (3.2),
[] , 0 ) 1 ( r ) p ( pY
dp
d
£ af + - (5.1)
which can be rewritten as
[] . 0 ) p ( ’ Y p ) 1 ( r ) p ( Y p
2 £ + af + - (5.2)
That is, the incentive constraint (5.2) can be obtained by summing the
participation constraint and p
2Y’(p) < 0. It is easy to see that when the intensive
constraint is binding, the participation constraint cannot bind. In contrast, when
the participation constraint is binding, the incentive constraint cannot bind. The
bank optimally attempts to choose such a probability of success that the incentive
constraint is binding: when a deposit rate rises, the bank decreases the probability14
of success. However, since the probability of success has a lower limit p, the
incentive constraint cannot bind when the deposit rate is very high. Let us denote
by r ˆ the highest deposit rate by which the incentive constraint is still binding, that
is
[] . 0 ) p ( ’ Y p ) 1 ( r ˆ ) p ( Y p
2 = + af + - (5.3)
Thus, the incentive constraint binds when 1 £ r £  r ˆ and it does not bind when
r > r ˆ.
/HPPD :KHQ£U£ U ˆGHSRVLWRUV¶H[SHFWHGXWLOLW\LVPD[LPL]HGVXEMHFWWR
WKH EDQNV¶ LQFHQWLYH FRQVWUDLQW VLQFH EDQN¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ FRQVWUDLQW LV QRW
ELQGLQJ :KHQ U!U ˆ GHSRVLWRUV¶ H[SHFWHG XWLOLW\ LV PD[LPL]HG VXEMHFW WR WKH
SDUWLFLSDWLRQFRQVWUDLQWVLQFHWKHLQFHQWLYHFRQVWUDLQWLVQRWELQGLQJ,QWKLVFDVH
WKHSUREDELOLW\RIVXFFHVVLVDWWKHPLQLPXPOHYHO S 
Let us study the case 1 £ r £  r ˆ; depositors’ utility is maximized subject to the
bank’s incentive constraint. We see from the binding incentive constraint, how the
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Because pY(p) is concave, dp/dr is negative: when deposit rate rises, the bank
increases risk taking and its probability of success decreases. This is realized by
depositors who maximize their expected utility (2.6),
. r )) r ( p 1 ( r ) r ( p )) r ( p , r ( U - a + = (5.5)
The deposit rate that maximizes depositors’ expected utility satisfies
, r ˆ r 1 , 0
dr
dp
r p ) 1 (
dr
)) r ( p , r ( dU
£ £ = ú û
ù
ê ë
é + a - + a = (5.6)
in which dp/dr is solved in (5.4). Next we will examine three cases in more detail:
no deposit insurance, full deposit insurance and partial insurance coverage.
5.1 No deposit insurance – rationing equilibrium
When a = 0, the optimal deposit rate (5.6) satisfies





)) r ( p , r ( dU
£ £ = + = (5.7)15
The first term is positive and it shows that depositors’ income increases when the
bank is successful. The second term is negative and it shows that depositors’
income decreases due to the lowered probability of success. Let us study the
conditions such that the optimal deposit rate in (5.7) exist. If p  +  r  dp/dr was
positive everywhere, depositors would favour maximal deposit rate and maximal
risk taking. Even possible, this alternative contradicts a common assumption of
deposit insurance models that the most risky assets of the economy are socially
unproductive.
$VVXPSWLRQ    S < S < WKHPRVWULVN\DVVHWVRIWKHHFRQRP\KDYHQHJDWLYH
139
This assumption ensures that the depositors will never raise deposit rate to the
level r ˆ, which provides negative expected income to them,  1 ) p ( Y p r ˆ p < < . Let us
denote by 
*
d r  the deposit interest rate which maximizes depositors’ expected
income. Given assumption 2, we know that  r ˆ r
*
d < . In contrast, if p + r dp/dr was
negative everywhere, depositors would wish to minimize the deposit rate, r = 1.
However, when r  =  1, a bank fails with a positive probability, p*(1)  <  1, and
depositors’ expected income is negative.
/HPPD 2QWKHORZHUOLPLWU DGHSRVLWFRQWUDFWKDVDQHJDWLYH139
Therefore, r = 1 cannot be optimal. Given Assumption 1, the lowest deposit rate
that provides the reservation level of utility to depositors is r*. Hence, we know
that 
*
d r * r 1 £ < . Lemma 2 and Assumptions 1, 2 ensure that an interior solution is
optimal. That is, there exist a deposit rate 
*
d r ,  r ˆ r * r
*
d < £ , which satisfies (5.7) and










Deposit interest rate, r
There exists a deposit interest rate which maximizes the expected
return to depositors.16
Consequently, a deposit market is characterized by rationing. As the deposit
interest rate rises, banks undertake riskier projects. Hence, depositors’ expected
income increases less rapidly than deposit rate; and beyond a point, actually
decreases. Deposit rate 
*
d r  maximizes depositors’ expected income and no
depositor will ever save in a bank which offers higher interest on deposits since
such a bank would be too risky. Given  r ˆ r * r
*
d < < , it is easy to see from (5.1) that
banks invest in too risky projects but extreme risk taking is avoided.
3URSRVLWLRQ   :KHQ EDQNV FRPSHWH IRU GHSRVLWV EXW WKHUH LV QR GHSRVLW





5.2 Full deposit insurance – extreme risk taking
When a = 1, the optimal deposit rate (5.6) satisfies
. r ˆ r 1 . 1
dr
dU
£ £ = (5.8)
Hence, the optimal deposit rate exceeds r ˆ and the incentive constraint is not
binding. Given Lemma 1, depositors’ expected utility will be maximized subject
to the bank’s participation constraint, in which the probability of success is at the
lower limit, p. Depositors’ utility is maximized by raising the deposit rate to the
upper limit,  ) 1 /( ) p ( Y r af + = , so that each bank earns zero profits.
3URSRVLWLRQ 8QGHUGHSRVLWLQVXUDQFHGHSRVLWRUVFKRRVHDEDQNWKDWRIIHUVWKH
KLJKHVWLQWHUHVWRQGHSRVLWV%DQNVLQYHVWLQH[WUHPHO\ULVN\SURMHFWV
Recall that without deposit insurance a rationing equilibrium occurs. Depositors’
expected income increases less rapidly than deposit rate; and beyond the point
actually decreases. Deposit insurance removes the rationing equilibrium: now
depositors’ expected income increases in proportionally to the deposit rate. This
excites competition for deposits since depositors optimally accept only the highest
interest offers.
Notice that a monopoly bank benefits from deposit insurance through a risk-
free deposit rate. The bank does not maximize its risk, since it gains by the risk-
free deposit rate only when risky projects succeed. If the banks compete for
borrowers, the case is almost identical. If the competition takes place in the
deposit market, it drives deposit rates up so that depositors receive high deposit
payments when the bank is successful. However, since deposits are fully insured,
depositors receive the very same payment from the insurer when the bank fails.
Hence, by rising the deposit rate a bank increases depositors’ income whether the
bank succeeds or not. This makes risk taking very attractive to depositors. If the
bank didn’t offer maximal interest on deposits, it could not raise deposits either.17
Competition for deposits thus drives up deposit rates and forces the banks to take
extreme risks.
However, if the most risky assets have negative NPV and if the deposit
insurance is fairly priced, no bank is formed. A high deposit insurance payment
makes bank formation unprofitable. Hence, banks will be formed only if the
deposit insurance fund is subsidized by government or if Assumption 2 is replaced
by such an  assumption that the most risky assets produce low, positive returns.
5.3 Partial insurance reduces risk taking
In this section we will show that the insurer can reduce risk taking by limiting
insurance coverage.
First we will show that deposit rate is increasing in insurance coverage. Recall
from (5.6) that the optimal deposit rate satisfies
, r ˆ r 1 , 0
dr
dp
r p ) 1 (
dr
)) r ( p , r ( dU
£ £ = ú û
ù
ê ë
é + a - + a = (5.6)
when the coverage is small enough. It is sufficient to show that deposit rate raises
in this optimal point, when the coverage is extended. We see from (5.6) how




























































é + - (5.10)
Hence, the denumerator of (5.9) is certainly positive. The second order condition











Given (5.11), we see that the numerator in (5.9) is negative. Given (5.10) and
(5.11) we see from (5.9) that dr/da > 0; deposit rate is increasing in insurance
coverage. We know from (5.1) that risk taking is increasing in deposit rate.
Therefore, risk taking increases when insurance coverage is extended. On the
contrary, the insurer can reduce risk taking by limiting coverage. Hence, partial
coverage can be used to reduce the moral hazard problem such as in the context of
standard insurance, e.g. Holmström (1979), Shavell (1979). Notice, however, that




The main objective of this paper is to examine how introducing deposit insurance
influences banks’ risk taking incentives when bank risk is unobservable to
depositors. To this end, we construct a simple framework of financial
intermediation in which both limited liability and deposit insurance play important
roles. By studying three forms of bank competition – a monopoly bank,
competition for borrowers and competition for deposits – we obtain the following
results.
– When bank risk is unobservable to depositors, introducing deposit insurance
may increase risk taking if banks compete for deposits. In contrast, if a bank
is a monopoly or if banks compete for borrowers only, deposit insurance has
no effect on risk taking.
– The magnitude of the risk taking problem depends on the type of bank
competition. When a bank is a monopoly or when banks compete for
borrowers, the chosen projects are too risky but extreme risk taking is
avoided. In contrast, when competition takes place in a deposit market, the
banks take extreme risks. Hence, deposit insurance and competition for
deposits seem to form a destructive combination.
These results mean that under deposit insurance, inroducing lending market
competition has no effect on risk taking. But introducing deposit market
competition will increase risk taking. During the past decades deregulation,
financial innovations and new information technology have increased financial
competition narrowing banks’ interest margins remarkably. On the asset side, the
borrowers that previously relied on bank loans now favour capital markets, for
example the commercial paper market. On the liability side, savers more often
prefer bond or stock investments to bank deposits. Interbank competition for
deposits has also increased. Deposit insurance schemes have traditionally included
ceilings on deposit rates (e.g. Regulation Q) which have prevented deposit rate
competition. The widespread deregulation in 1980s removed ceilings and
liberalized interbank competition. Consequently, the threat of excessive
competition for deposits may now be more topical than ever before. Therefore,
given the large number of bank crises during 1980s and 1990s, considerable
attention must be given on designing the bank regulation system in general and
the deposit insurance scheme in particular.
Our results offer some implications for regulation. Most of all, regulators
should focus on competition in input markets; that is, they should monitor deposit
rates in the bank sector and benefit-to-premium ratios in the insurance industry.
High deposit rates or high benefit-to-premium rations may provide a useful early
warning signal of forthcoming financial difficulties. When insurance is complate
and the input market is competative regulation of deposit rates and benefit-to-19
premium ratios may be instrumental to discourage risk taking. Alternatively, risk
taking can be restricted by setting high enough equity requirements to banks.
9
Our simple analysis has some limitations. For example, only three extreme
competition alternatives are examined. Moreover, the risk-return function is rather
special and includes an assumption of fully correlated loan risks. In addition,
adverse selection problem is excluded. Therefore, the results should be taken as
preliminary, providing a useful point for a more general analysis that addressess
these issues.
                                                
9 It is possible to show that equity restricts risk taking in our framework whether deposits are
insured or not. Extreme risk taking is then certainly avoided.20
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